Regulating the cost of small loans: Overdue or overkill? by McGill, Denise et al.
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
McGill, Denise, Corones, Stephen G., & Howell, Nicola (2012) Regulating
the cost of small loans : overdue or overkill? Company and Securities Law
Journal, 30(3), pp. 149-169.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/50549/
c© Copyright 2012 Lawbook Co
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
Regulating the cost of small loans: overdue or overkill? 
 
Mrs Denise McGill 
Senior Lecturer 
Faculty of Law 
Queensland University of Technology 
 
Professor Stephen Corones 
Faculty of Law 
Queensland University of Technology 
 
Ms Nicola Howell  
Lecturer 
Faculty of Law 
Queensland University of Technology 
 
 
Contact author:  
 
Mrs Denise McGill 
Faculty of Law 
Queensland University of Technology 
2 George St  
Brisbane, Qld 4001 
Tel: 07 3138 1458 
Email: d.mcgill@qut.edu.au 
 
 
 2 
 
Regulating the cost of small loans: overdue or overkill? 
 
Abstract 
 
Small-amount short-term lending began in 1994 in response to the initial exemption 
of such loans from consumer credit regulation. Growing demand for such loans now 
produces industry turnover of approximately $800 million each year. Regulators 
recognised early the need for consumer protection due to the vulnerability of 
borrowers and the emergence of various predatory practices. This led to reforms 
designed to regulate these loans, prevent particular misconduct and provide 
remedies against injustice.   Some were enacted as part of the National Consumer 
Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth), which also imposed licensing and responsible 
lending requirements on lenders and increased consumer access to remedies. The 
Government has now introduced the Consumer Credit and Corporations 
Amendment (Enhancements) Bill 2011 which limits the price that can be charged for 
credit and restricts access to small loans.  This article examines the extensive reforms 
which have taken place in this sector, and compares these regulatory approaches 
with the “bright line approach” of the Enhancements Bill. The article argues that the 
repercussions of this step will require careful monitoring to ensure that further harm 
is not suffered by those least able to bear it, and that the government will also need 
to facilitate other, more sustainable, solutions to the problem that small loans are 
currently used to solve. After we wrote this article, the Report of the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services and the Report of the Senate 
Economics Legislation Committee on the Enhancements Bill were released. These are 
referred to in a postscript.   
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I  Introduction 
On 21 September 2011, the Commonwealth Government introduced the Consumer 
Credit and Corporations Amendment (Enhancements) Bill 2011 (‘the Enhancements 
Bill’) into the Australian Parliament. This Bill seeks to implement Phase Two of the 
National Consumer Credit Government Action Plan (the Action Plan), to which the 
Government committed itself in 2009.1 Phase One of the Action Plan was largely 
implemented by the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth). One of the 
more controversial proposals in the Enhancements Bill is the proposal to introduce 
national price regulation for consumer credit.  This would replace the interest rate 
caps that have been recently operating in some States and Territories.  
This article takes the view that interference with the market in the form of price 
regulation is a very serious step. The decision to introduce price regulation in the 
consumer credit market is not one that should be taken lightly, without serious 
consideration of the potential implications for all stakeholders. This should include 
the impact of a reduced supply upon consumers, and the development of alternative 
means of addressing the need that is currently being fulfilled for many by the small 
loans provided by the commercial sector.2 Further, if the legislation is passed, 
significant efforts need to be devoted to monitoring its impact.  
This article examines the provisions of the Enhancements Bill that deal with price 
regulation, and locates the proposals within the wider framework of consumer credit 
regulation, including the reforms already implemented in Phase One, as well as other 
existing legislation that provides protection in this market.  
                                               
1 Australian Government, National Consumer Credit Government Action Plan, undated,  
http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1381/PDF/NCC_Brochure_02102008.pdf  viewed 9 
November 2011. 
2 In this article, we are not considering the small loans provided in the community or non-profit sector 
(for example, under No Interest Loan Schemes, or Low Interest Loan Schemes), as these loans are 
provided at a significantly lower cost, and often over a longer repayment period. For example, 
National Australia Bank offers a ‘StepUp Loan’ to low-income consumers at a rate of 3.99% per 
annum, with loan amounts of $800-$3000, and a loan period of between 6 months and 3 years: 
http://www.nab.com.au/wps/wcm/connect/nab/nab/home/about_us/7/4/3/4 viewed 25 November 
2011. 
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This article is divided into four parts. First, we set the scene by examining the scope 
of the small loans market, the problems identified in this market, and the stated 
policy aims of the Enhancements Bill. Second, we explain the recent history of 
consumer credit reform as it relates to this market and the problems identified in it. 
We include discussion of the changes that have been implemented in Phase One, 
including responsible lending and licensing, as well as the pre-existing provisions of 
the consumer credit legislation allowing for the re-opening of unjust transactions. 
These latter provisions have become even more relevant following the reforms in 
Phase One designed to prevent small, short term loans from being taken outside the 
Code. The third part of the article outlines the additional measures proposed in the 
Enhancements Bill and considers their implications. In the fourth part we explore the 
types of regulatory reform that are used to deal with problems in the consumer 
credit market, and compare the advantages and disadvantages of a flexible 
individualised approach with a decontextualised bright line approach. Finally, on the 
assumption that the Enhancements Bill is likely to be passed, we discuss the need to 
facilitate alternatives to small loans if supply is affected and to monitor closely the 
impact of the legislation.   
 
II Background to the new national proposals for regulating small loans 
The provisions of the Enhancements Bill that we consider in this paper focus on loans 
that have often been called payday loans or microloans. Payday lending has been 
defined in the following way:  
“Short-term small amount lending typically refers to loans of between $200 
and $2,000 that must be repaid within a short period of time, such as by the 
borrower's next payday”.3 
                                               
3 The Hon Bill Shorten MP, Reforms to Payday lending, Media Release 25 August 2011,  
http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2011/123.htm&pageID=003&
min=brs&Year=&DocType=0 viewed 9 November 2011. 
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Small loans of a longer duration (months rather than weeks) are also available in 
Australia.   
In 2008 the National Financial Services Federation (NFSF) estimated that the amount 
lent in the form of payday loans and microloan advances was $500 million per 
annum.4 By 2011 the NFSF estimated that the size of the market had grown 
significantly to $800 million.5 
Borrowers who have recourse to these types of loans are predominantly low-income 
earners.  The Regulation Impact Statement (RIS) for the Enhancements Bill reviewed 
the findings of a number of Australian studies and industry data and concluded that 
approximately 40 to 49 per cent of short-term customers have an annual income of 
less than $24,000, and between 50 to 74 per cent of short term customers have an 
annual income of less than $36,000.6 The RIS also concluded that perhaps up to 25% 
of short-term customers had incomes falling below the Henderson Poverty Line.7  
The most recent Australian study (conducted by RMIT University and University of 
Queensland) interviewed 112 borrowers in 2010, and found that 78% of borrowers 
were in receipt of a Centrelink pension or payment; 75% were renting publicly or 
privately, while less than 1% owned their own home; 40% had dependent children, 
and less than one-quarter had some form of paid employment.8  
 
Different studies also show fairly consistently that small loans are predominantly 
used to meet basic living expenses and needs.9 For example, research by the 
                                               
4 National Financial Services Federation, Submission to Financial Services and Credit Reform Green 
Paper (2008) p2. 
5 National Financial Services Federation, n 4,   p3. 
6 Regulation Impact Statement, The Regulation of Short Term, Small Amount Finance (June 2011)  p 
15, http://ris.finance.gov.au/files/2011/09/RIS-Short-term-small-amount-finance.pdf viewed 9 
November 2011. 
7 Regulation Impact Statement, The Regulation of Short Term, Small Amount Finance (June 2011)  p 
15, http://ris.finance.gov.au/files/2011/09/RIS-Short-term-small-amount-finance.pdf viewed 9 
November 2011. 
8 Banks M, Caught Short: Exploring the role of small, short-term loans in the lives of Australians, 
Interim Report (September 2011), pp 8-9. 
9 Regulation Impact Statement, The Regulation of Short Term, Small Amount Finance (June 2011)  p 
17, http://ris.finance.gov.au/files/2011/09/RIS-Short-term-small-amount-finance.pdf viewed 9 
November 2011. 
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Consumer Action Law Centre Victoria in 2008 found that, of the 448 borrowers 
surveyed, the most common reason for borrowing was car repairs or registration, 
followed by essential living expenses (utility bills or food), and then rent.10 Similarly, 
the 2010 RMIT/UQ research found that the seven most commonly cited reasons for 
borrowing their first loan were to meet regular, weekly-type needs and expenses.11  
 
Another consistent finding of studies in Australia is that those using small loans 
suffer from a lack of choice in credit options. The RMIT/UQ research explains it this 
way: 
Most people accessing small loans live in such impoverished circumstances 
that notions of customer choice lose meaning. One of the study’s clearest 
findings was that many people talked about the lack of options they had in 
struggling to manage their finances.12 (original emphasis) 
 
Key concerns about payday and microloans loans include the following: 
 
1. High cost. Research indicates that some small amount short loan providers 
charge very high rates of interest (when considered on an annualised basis),13 
with effective interest charges commonly in the range of 300 – 800% per 
annum for 2-4 week loans, and 100-500% for longer loans. 14 At the extreme, 
rates can be as high as 1300% per annum.15 Alternatively, credit providers 
may not charge a high or any interest rate but instead impose high fees and 
                                               
10 Gillam, Z and the Consumer Action Law Centre, Payday Loans: Helping hand or quicksand? An 
examination of high-cost short term lending in Australia, 2002-2010 (September 2010) p 59. 
11 Banks, n 8, p 14.  
12 Banks, n 8,  p 23.  
13 Wilson D, Payday Lending in Victoria- A research report (2002) (Consumer Law Centre of Victoria) p 
11, 33; Marston G and Shevellar L, The Experience of Using Fringe Lenders in Queensland: A Pilot Study 
(July 2010) p 39, p 53.  
14 For example, Gillam, n 10, pp 286-288 (for online loans); Howell N, Wilson T and Davidson J Interest 
rate caps: Protection or paternalism? Centre for Credit and Consumer Law Research Paper (2008), pp 
41-46. 
15 Wilson, n 13, p 33, p 46; Gillam, n 10, p 65. Lenders justify these costs on the basis that the 
establishment and service costs of a small loan are comparable to larger loan and because the rate of 
return is much lower a high interest rate is charged to make the practice financially viable. Marston 
and Shevellar, n 13,  p 37. There is also increased risk for this kind of loan.  
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charges.16 Some short term lenders have a range of fees including an 
application fee, establishment fee, account management fee, dishonour fee, 
late payment fee and information fee,17 all adding to the cost of the loan.  
 
2. Risk of debt spirals and debt traps. The combination of the high cost, the fact 
that many borrowers are on relatively low incomes, and easy access to 
rollovers, can result in a risk of a debt spiral or debt trap. There is some 
disagreement in the research about the extent to which cycles of revolving 
loans for borrowers unable to repay a loan on time is a problem in the 
sector.18 It can be difficult to estimate the extent of rollovers because 
statistics do not account for use of more than one lender at a time or the use 
of a loan from one lender to pay off another. 19 However, the RMIT/UQ study 
concluded that: 
The majority of respondents were continuously indebted to one or 
more short-term, small-loan, companies for considerable periods of 
time.20 
 
3. Avoidance of regulation. A particular concern in the early days of the 
development of the small loans market was practices by lenders to avoid the 
application of the then Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC). Avoidance 
practices have also been noted in jurisdictions introducing an all-inclusive 
interest rate cap.21 
 
                                               
16 Regulatory Impact Statement for  SL 2007 No 302 (Consumer Credit (Bill Facilities) Amendment 
Regulation (No 1) 2007 (Qld)) made under the Consumer Credit (Queensland) Act 1994 (Qld) p 17; 
Marston and Shevellar, n 13, p 39, p 53. 
17 Regulatory Impact Statement for SL 2007 No 302 (Consumer Credit (Bill Facilities) Amendment 
Regulation (No 1) 2007 (Qld) p29; Wilson, n 13,  p 46.  
18 Marston and Shevellar, n 13, pp 36-39. 
19 Marston and Shevellar, n 13,  p 37. 
20 Banks, n 8, p 18. 
21 Industry representatives to the Corporations and Financial Services Committee hearing on the 
Enhancements Bill referred to six methods of ‘accommodating’ the NSW interest rate cap of 48%: 
Commonwealth of Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services, Consumer Credit and Corporations Legislation Amendment 
(Enhancements) Bill 2011, 24 August 2011, p 26. 
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4. Unfair practices. In addition to the high costs, concerns have been raised 
about unfair practices by short-term lenders, including: overcommitment, 
providing unsuitable or unaffordable loans, unjust contracts, taking securities 
over basic household items, and unfair use of direct debit facilities.22 
 
As we discuss below, many of these concerns have now been addressed through 
regulatory reform up to and including the Phase One changes. However, there is still 
some concern in the community that the first two issues (high cost and risk of debt 
spirals) have not yet been fully resolved. The Enhancements Bill therefore focuses on 
these two remaining issues. 
 
For example, at the Consumer 2011 conference, the Assistant Treasurer, the Hon Bill 
Shorten MP, defined the consumer problem to be addressed by the Enhancements 
Bill as follows: 
The opportunity for exploitation is obvious.  Some lenders may charge 
excessive costs simply because the consumer is unlikely to be able to obtain 
credit elsewhere.  And repeated borrowings can result in a debt spiral as an 
increasing proportion of the borrower's income is used to pay the costs 
associated with borrowing.23 
 
According to the Assistant Treasurer, market failure is a driver for intervention: 
The responsible role of government is to facilitate a competitive free market 
and to intervene when the market fails. Here there is market failure: the 
price of borrowing money is too high...Our solution strikes a balance between 
                                               
22 A summary of the concerns that consumer advocates have with small, short term loans is in Howell, 
Wilson and Davidson, n 14, pp  
54-58. 
23 The Hon Bill Shorten, MP, “Consumer Reform and Consumer”, Presentation to the Consumer 2011 
conference, Sydney Convention and Exhibition Centre, Darling Harbour, 8 June 2011, 
http://www.dpm.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=speeches/2011/020.htm&pageID=005&min=brs&Yea
r=&DocType= viewed 9 November 2011. 
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protecting consumers from exploitation and allowing lenders to charge a 
reasonable fee for their product.24 
 
Along similar lines, but with perhaps a slightly different emphasis, the RIS sets out 
the objectives of the legislation as being to: 
• assist consumers to have a greater degree of social and financial inclusion; 
and 
• mitigate the particular risks associated with short term credit (and to do so in 
a way that minimises the risk of avoidance).25 
 
The remainder of this article will examine the existing and proposed regulation in 
light of the expressed concerns and objectives in relation to small loans.  
 
III Existing protections: The recent history of regulating consumer credit generally 
and small loans specifically 
 
The recent past is full of regulatory reform in consumer credit, with many reform 
projects specifically focused on the small loans market, and the problems that were 
identified as this market began to develop. Later, the focus shifted to broader credit 
regulation, impacting on the whole of the consumer credit market, including the 
small loans market. That the high cost and possible repeat borrowing are the 
principal problems remaining is the result of this series of reforms designed to 
eliminate previous problems identified in this market.  
 
                                               
24 The Hon Bill Shorten “Payday loans need capping” Australian Financial Review 21 September 2011, 
p 68. 
25 Regulation Impact Statement, “The Regulation of Short Term, Small Amount Finance” (June 2011)  p 
40, http://ris.finance.gov.au/files/2011/09/RIS-Short-term-small-amount-finance.pdf viewed 9 
November 2011. 
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A. Code Avoidance 
 
A key initial concern with payday lending was that the loans were not covered by the 
UCCC. This issue was first addressed in 2001, where the exemption from the UCCC of 
loans for a period not exceeding 62 days26 was limited to loans where the fees and 
charges did not exceed 5% of the amount of the loan and the interest rate did not 
exceed 24% per annum.27 A further amendment required the inclusion in this 
calculation of any fee payable to another party for referral to or from the credit 
provider. 28 These prevented short-term, high cost loans from being taken outside 
the UCCC. 29    
 
In order to prevent small loan providers from using the bill facilities exemption in the 
UCCC, amendments were made in 2007 to restrict the exemption to commercial 
facilities provided by an authorised deposit-taking institution.30   
 
Further changes to reduce the opportunities for avoidance were made through the 
National Consumer Code (NCC), which replaced the UCCC in 2010.31.  The 
pawnbroker exemption in the former UCCC32  was limited to loans on the security of 
pledges of goods where the sole remedy of the pawnbroker for failure to repay was 
the sale of the goods pledged.33  
 
In addition, the NCC made several changes to the conclusive nature of a declaration 
that the credit was provided for a business or investment purpose and thus outside 
                                               
26 Uniform Consumer Credit Code s7(1).  
27 Consumer Credit (Qld) Amendment Act 2001 (Qld) s 4, amending Uniform Consumer Credit Code 
s7(1). 
28 See National Credit Code ss 6(2), (3); Regulatory Impact Statement for SL 2007 No 302 (Consumer 
Credit (Bill Facilities) Amendment Regulation (No 1) 2007 (Qld) pp 6, 33.  
29 Consumer Credit (Bill Facilities) Amendment Regulation (No 1) 2007 (Qld) Regulatory Impact 
Statement for SL 2007 No 302 p 8. 
30 Consumer Credit (Bill Facilities) Amendment Regulation 2007 (Qld) Regulation 5B; now s6 (7) NCC. 
For an explanation of the misuse of the exemption and the predatory practice, see Consumer Credit 
(Bill Facilities) Amendment Regulation (No 1) 2007 (Qld) Regulatory Impact Statement for SL 2007 No 
302 pp 6, 8, 25-26. 
31 The National Credit Code is implemented as Schedule 1 to the National Consumer Credit Protection 
Act 2009 (Cth). 
32 Uniform Consumer Credit Code s 7(7). 
33 National Credit Code s 6(9). 
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the operation of the NCC. First, although a signed declaration gives rise to a 
presumption that the credit is not to be used for Code purposes, that presumption is 
not conclusive: s13 (2).34 Second, the declaration is not effective if the credit 
provider or a prescribed person35 knew or had reason to believe that the credit was 
to be applied for a Code purpose: s13(3), and they are fixed with the knowledge or 
belief they would have obtained from making reasonable inquiries: s13 (3). The 
prescribed person is defined widely so that the credit provider needs to obtain the 
declaration itself to gain protection from the risk of the declaration being 
ineffective.36 Then if the declaration is ineffective, the credit is taken to have been 
provided for a Code purpose:  s 13 (4). Also a person commits an offence of strict 
liability if they induce a debtor to make a false or misleading declaration:  s13 (6), (7).  
 
 
B. General unfair practices 
 
In response to concerns about so-called ‘blackmail securities’, the NCC prohibited 
the taking of a mortgage over low value37 goods used by the mortgagor to earn 
income by personal exertion and over goods (other than antiques) that are essential 
household property.38 There is an exception from the latter where the mortgagee 
was the supplier of the goods in the course of the mortgagee’s business or was a 
linked credit provider of the supplier: s50.39  Only goods similar to those prescribed 
                                               
34 This implements the recommendation to remove the effect that the presumption from a BPD is 
conclusive: Regulatory Impact Statement for SL 2007 No 302 (Consumer Credit (Bill Facilities) 
Amendment Regulation (No 1) 2007 p 6, 77. 
35 National Consumer Credit Protection Regulations 2010 (Cth) reg 67 defines the prescribed person to 
be the person who obtained the declaration from the debtor, and where it was obtained by someone 
other than the credit provider, any person who referred the debtor, or in the course of their business 
suggested the debtor apply for the credit or assisted the debtor to apply for the credit.  
36 Explanatory Memorandum National Consumer Credit Protection Bill 2009 (Cth) para 8.63 p255. 
37 The limit for the financial year commencing 1 July 2010 was $3400 indexed in accordance with the 
Consumer Price Index: Beatty A and Smith, A,  Annotated National Credit Code (4th edition LexisNexis 
Butterworths 2011) para [50.05]. 
38 The purpose was to prevent “a small proportion of fringe credit providers” from “taking bills of sale 
over essential household goods, including pots and pans, cutlery, fridges, tables and chairs, beds, 
children’s cots etc”, labelled “blackmail securities”: Regulatory Impact Statement for SL 2007 No 302 
(Consumer Credit (Bill Facilities) Amendment Regulation (No 1) 2007 pp 20, 53. 
39 The purpose was to protect the operations of lenders offering loans or hire purchase agreements 
for the purchase of new household goods as these loans use security over the goods being purchased: 
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for the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) may be prescribed as “essential household 
property.”40 
 
In relation to the use of direct debit authorities, there was concern about the 
potential for repeated access to a borrower’s bank account, irrespective of whether 
there was any money there. This in turn resulted in the borrower’s bank imposing 
charges on the account for each attempt at access.41 The NCC addresses this 
problem by requiring a credit provider to give the debtor a notice when a default 
from a direct debit has occurred: s 87NCC.  This need be given once only, but must 
be within 10 business days of the first default. Failure to give the notice is an offence 
of strict liability. The notice informs the debtor of the default and advises of their 
options and rights 42  so they can take action to minimise their loss. 43   
 
 
C. Risk of overcommitment and debt spirals – the Responsible Lending 
Requirements  
The UCCC did not impose a direct obligation on credit providers to assess a 
prospective borrower’s capacity to pay,44 relying instead on the fact that a failure to 
assess capacity is an indicia of injustice.45 (Unjust transactions are discussed further 
below). However, the Phase One reforms now impose positive and prescriptive 
obligations upon all credit providers, including small loan providers, to lend 
responsibly.   
                                                                                                                                      
Regulatory Impact Statement for SL 2007 No 302 (Consumer Credit (Bill Facilities) Amendment 
Regulation (No 1) 2007 p 70. 
40 National Credit Code, s 50(3), 50(4). None have yet been prescribed. 
41 The misconduct that was identified consisted of repeatedly accessing a borrower’s bank account, 
irrespective of whether there was any money there, which resulted in the borrower’s bank imposing 
charges on the account for each attempt at access: Marston and L Shevellar, n 13,  p 37, p 53. 
42 The notice must be in accordance with Form 11: s 87(3); Regulation 85. 
43 The misconduct that was identified consisted of repeatedly accessing a borrower’s bank account, 
irrespective of whether there was any money there, which resulted in the borrower’s bank imposing 
charges on the account for each attempt at access: Marston and Shevellar, n 13, p 37, p 53. 
44  Explanatory Memorandum, National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 para 3.15.  
45 Uniform Consumer Credit Code s70(2)(l). 
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The new responsible lending requirements are found in Chapter 3 of the National 
Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) (NCCP Act), with those relevant to 
licensees who are credit providers under credit contracts in Part 3-2.46 The primary 
obligation is to make an assessment whether a credit contract or an increase in the 
credit limit will be unsuitable for the consumer, within 90 days before entering into 
the credit contract or increasing the credit limit: s 129. Failure to make the 
assessment attracts a civil penalty. The licensee must provide a written copy of the 
assessment on demand. 47  
 
To make the assessment, the credit provider must make reasonable inquiries about 
the consumer’s requirements and financial situation and take reasonable steps to 
actually verify the consumer’s financial situation: s 130. The credit provider may take 
into account only information about the consumer’s financial situation that the 
licensee had reason to believe was true or would have had reason to believe was 
true if the licensee had made the inquiries or verifications required: s131 (4). Failure 
to make these inquiries and verifications attracts a civil penalty. A contract will be 
unsuitable for the consumer if, at the time of the assessment, it will not meet the 
consumer’s requirements or objectives if the contract is entered or the credit limit is 
increased or it is likely that the consumer will be unable to comply with the 
consumer’s financial obligations under the contract,48 or could comply only with 
substantial hardship: s 131(2) (a).49 
 
                                               
46 Those applying to credit assistance providers (brokers) are in Part 3-1, National Consumer Credit 
Protection Act 2009 (Cth).  
47 This must be done within specified times: National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) s 
132(1), (2), without charge: s 132 (4).  
48 The consumer’s ability to meet all of the repayments, fees, charges and transaction costs of 
complying with the proposed credit contract must be assessed: Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, Regulatory Guide 209 Credit licensing: Responsible Lending Conduct (March 2011) para 
209.27.  
49 A contract will also be unsuitable if it will not meet the consumer’s requirements or objectives. See 
also Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) Part 2, Div 2, Subdivision E, 
which implies terms into contracts for the supply of financial services including credit –a warranty 
that the credit service will be rendered with due care and skill and, if the consumer makes known 
their purpose or desired result, a warranty that the services will be reasonably fit for the purpose or 
might reasonably be expected to achieve that result. 
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In its Regulatory Guide 209 (RG209), the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) explained that the obligation to verify the consumer’s financial 
position is “scalable” so varies according to the circumstances. However, RG209 also 
notes that “if a consumer is on a low income, even a small loan can cause financial 
difficulties for them”, and that therefore lenders will be expected to make more 
inquiries in order to meet the responsible lending obligations.50   Although 
“substantial hardship” is not defined in the NCCP Act, ASIC has identified some 
relevant factors, including the money expected to be left over from income after 
deducting living expenses, and the consistency and reliability of the consumer’s 
income.51  
 
Refinancing or “rolling over” an existing short term small amount loan also requires 
compliance with the responsible lending obligations.  Both the Explanatory 
Memorandum for the NCCP Act and RG209 have advised – “…where a consumer is 
refinancing, particularly where they are having difficulties meeting the repayments, 
or are even in arrears, on their existing credit contract…it will be possible to 
determine that the consumer cannot meet the repayments of the amount being 
charged under that contract, and a contract will prima facie be unsuitable where the 
repayments are at the same or a similar level.” 52    
 
If a proposed credit contract or an increase in the credit limit is unsuitable for the 
consumer, the licensee is prohibited from entering into that contract or from 
increasing the credit limit under it: s 133. Contravention makes the licensee liable to 
a civil penalty and for a criminal offence: s 133 (6).  
                                               
50 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Regulatory Guide 209 Credit licensing: 
Responsible lending Conduct (March 2011) Table 3. 
51 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Regulatory Guide 209 Credit licensing: 
Responsible Lending Conduct (March 2011) paras 209.63- 209.72. 
52 Explanatory Memorandum, National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 para 3.148; Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission Regulatory Guide 209 Credit licensing: Responsible lending 
conduct (March 2011) para 209.82. See also Government of South Australia: Office of Consumer and 
Business Affairs, Payday lending in South Australia - options to increase consumer protection, 
Discussion Paper (2006) p 19. 
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Remedies for breach of these obligations are provided in Chapter 4 of the NCCP Act. 
A consumer who suffers loss or damage as a result of entering into an unsuitable 
contract may seek compensation for the loss or damage (s 178),  or an order from a 
wide range, including a declaration that the whole or part of the contract is void, an 
order varying the contract, or directing the credit provider to refund money. 53 ASIC 
may also apply for remedies. 54  
The responsible lending requirements effectively prohibit lending and extending or 
renewing a loan where there is no reasonable capacity to repay. It has been 
suggested therefore that compliance with, and enforcement of, these requirements 
them should prevent the problem of debt traps and debt spirals that can be 
associated with small loans. Indeed, at the time of the introduction of the 
responsible lending obligations, the then Minister suggested that the effect of the 
introduction of responsible lending obligations would be considered and compared 
between the jurisdictions with interest rate caps, and those that did not have a cap, 
and the Government could then ‘determine whether it is appropriate to maintain 
that 48% cap’.55 However, it is not known whether any formal or detailed analysis 
has been undertaken.  
On the other hand, consumer advocates have argued that the responsible lending 
obligations do not adequately address the problems in the small loan market, as the 
small amounts lent, considered in isolation, may not be ‘not unsuitable’, and in any 
case, the likelihood of enforcement is low.56 And the RIS for the Enhancements Bill 
notes that, despite the introduction of the responsible lending requirements, there 
does not seem to have been any significant changes to practices in the area where 
                                               
53 National Credit Code s 79; Explanatory Memorandum, National Consumer Credit Protection Act 
2009 para 4.79. 
54 National Credit Code ss 177 – 179. 
55 Senator the Hon Nick Sherry, Joint Press Conference with Tony D’Aloisio ASIC Chairman, 27 April 
2009, 
http://minscl.treasurer.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=transcripts/2009/021.htm&pageID=004&min=n
js&Y viewed 9 November 2011. 
56 See for example, Consumer Action Law Centre, Submission to Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Securities, and Senate Economics Committee (October 2011) pp 8-9, 
http://www.consumeraction.org.au/downloads/CALCsubmission-
ConsumerCreditandCorporationsLegislationAmendmentEnhancementsbill-141011.pdf (viewed 7 
November 2011).  
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the obligations would be expected to have the greatest impact, that is the very 
short-term loans with a single high repayment.57 ASIC has also recently reported on 
the implementation of the responsible lending requirements in the small loans 
sector, and has identified some ‘potential compliance risks’58. The outcome of a case 
recently instituted against a small loans provider may also give further guidance on 
the impact of the responsible lending obligations in this market.59 
 
D. Existing statutory protections affecting high cost loans and overcommitment 
 
Challenges to unjust transactions and establishment fees 
Even in the absence of interest rate restrictions or other price regulation at the 
Commonwealth level, it is possible to see that the provision of remedies for unjust 
transactions and for certain unconscionable charges in the NCC (re-enacted from the 
UCCC) could be used to challenge high cost loans, whether the costs are high 
because of high interest rates and/or high fees and charges, and/or 
overcommitment. Similarly, prohibitions against unconscionable conduct and now 
also unfair contract terms in the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
Act 2001 (Cth) (ASIC Act) could be seen to place constraints on the cost of small 
loans.  
 
Unjust transactions 
Where small loan providers charge high interest or a combination of no or low 
interest and then very high fees and charges, the transaction as a whole may be 
                                               
57 Regulation Impact Statement, The Regulation of Short Term, Small Amount Finance (June 2011)  p 
38, http://ris.finance.gov.au/files/2011/09/RIS-Short-term-small-amount-finance.pdf viewed 9 
November 2011. 
58 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Review of microlenders’ responsible lending 
conduct and disclosure obligations, Report 264, (November 2011), 
http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/rep264-published-22-November-
2011.pdf/$file/rep264-published-22-November-2011.pdf viewed 24 November 2011, pp 7-8. 
59 Consumer Action Law Centre, Payday Lending practices challenged in court, Media Release, 17 
October 2011. 
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challenged as unjust under s 76NCC. It is also possible to challenge an establishment 
fee as unconscionable: s 78NCC. 60 
 
Section 76 NCC provides that a court may, if satisfied that in the circumstances 
relating to a contract at the time it was entered into or changed, the contract was 
unjust, re-open the transaction that gave rise to the contract or change. In making 
the determination, the court is to have regard to the broad requirement of “the 
public interest” and “all the circumstances of the case” and “may” have regard to a 
list of specific matters: s 76(2). The reference to “changed” would include an 
increase in the credit limit or the rollover of an existing credit contract. If a court 
decides to reopen a transaction and to provide some relief, a wide range of orders is 
available in order to achieve a more just outcome: s 77 NCC.  
 
 
Section 76 covers both procedural and substantive injustice.61 A claim based on the 
high cost of credit would focus on the issue of substantive injustice, where the terms 
or consequences of a contract are unjust. This will be the case if a contractual 
provision imposes an unreasonable burden on one party or is not reasonably 
necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of the other party. The indicia 
of substantive injustice in s 76 (2) are - the effect on the debtor of compliance with 
the terms of the contract (a),(e) (first limb); whether the debtor will be able to repay 
without substantial hardship (l);62 whether the terms are unreasonable or are 
justified in the light of the risks undertaken by the credit provider (e) (second limb) 
and (m); and the terms of comparable transactions and interest rates: s 76(2)(n). 
These latter paragraphs – (l), (m) and (n) - appear to be the most relevant in the 
small loan context.  There is also a general catch-all provision allowing a court to 
consider anything else relevant to the transaction: (o).  
                                               
60 Director Consumer Affairs Victoria v JLL Pty Ltd [2005] VCAT 1989 President Morris at [28]-[32].  
61 For a full discussion of s 70 and the indicia of injustice see Annotated Consumer Credit Code Denise 
McGill and Lindy Willmott LBC Information Services 1999 [70.1] -  [70.34.2] pp 447-512. 
62 The expression “substantial hardship” is not a technical term and should be given its ordinary 
meaning, Parliament’s use of “substantial” indicated that something more than mere hardship was 
meant, and the debtor’s overall financial position must be assessed rather than just a comparison 
between income and expenses:  Silberman v Citigroup Pty Ltd [2011] VSC 514 Whelan J [11] – [18]. 
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An application may be made by a debtor,63 and the NCC now allows for ASIC to bring 
an action in respect of one or more contracts or a class of contracts entered into by a 
credit provider during a specified period: s 79.64  
 
Although the RIS suggested that there are no recorded cases of either consumers or 
regulators having successfully using s 76 of the NCC or equivalent provisions of the 
UCCC,65  we have identified a number of cases where courts have been prepared to 
reopen credit contracts with small loan providers on the basis they were unjust. 
These include:   
 
• Cash Solutions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Turner and Maguire [2008] QDC 108. 
The lender had made four advances to a mother and son of amounts varying 
between $2000 and $5000 for airfares, car repairs and Christmas presents. 66 The 
interest rate on all amounts advanced was 204% per annum.67 The lender had taken 
security over the son’s vehicle, which was later repossessed. The judge considered 
that the interest rate exceeded what might “reasonably be required to reflect the 
degree of risk presented by” the debtors’ situations.68 The judge fixed the rate at 
48%, on the basis that was the capped rate in jurisdictions other than Queensland 
and was about to be introduced in Queensland.69 
 
• Silvy v Hadeler [2008] SADC 64  
In this case, a debtor borrowed $2500 in March 2005 from a moneylender who 
operated a business known as “Cash on Wheels.”   The loan schedule provided for an 
interest rate of 10% every 28 days and a default interest rate of 80% every 28 days. 
                                               
63 Or mortgagor or guarantor. 
64 Regulatory Impact Statement for SL 2007 No 302 (Consumer Credit (Bill Facilities) Amendment 
Regulation (No 1) 2007 p 6-7. 
65 Regulation Impact Statement, The Regulation of Short Term, Small Amount Finance (June 2011)  p 
10, http://ris.finance.gov.au/files/2011/09/RIS-Short-term-small-amount-finance.pdf viewed 9 
November 2011. 
66 Cash Solutions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Turner and Maguire [2008] QDC 108 at [3]. 
67 Cash Solutions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Turner and Maguire [2008] QDC 108 at [6]. 
68 Cash Solutions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Turner and Maguire [2008] QDC 108 at [33]. 
69 Cash Solutions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Turner and Maguire [2008] QDC 108 at [33]. 
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The debtor made various payments to the lender but was given a receipt on some 
occasions only. The loan was found to be unjust for several reasons. 70 The debtor’s 
claim to have paid at least between $3200 by 16 December 2005 was accepted and 
she was relieved of any payment in excess of that amount.  (This was the equivalent 
of at least 28% interest for 9 months or an APR of 37 %.)  
 
There are also sometwo recent cases involving short term loans for larger amounts, 
where the contracts were held unjust solely on the grounds of the high costs of the 
credit: 
 
• Australian Capital Providers Pty Ltd v Wakelin [2009] QSC 167. 
In this case, a loan for an amount of approximately $558,000 for four months was 
found to be unjust. The contract provided for an interest rate of 11% per month 
(annualised to 132%) reduced to 7% per month (annualised at 84%) if not in 
default.71 The judge considered that an interest rate of 132% or even 84% exceeded 
what was justifiable, even for this high risk borrower and short term loan, and varied 
the contract to reduce the interest rate to 48%.72  
 
• Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 343 
Here, the debtor borrowed $807,000 for 2 months, at interest of 60% per annum 
and default interest of 120% per annum, both of which were compound interest. The 
court found that the way the compounding interest default rate operated was unjust 
- it had the potential to be “utterly crushing” to a borrower.73 The court also found 
                                               
70 The form of the schedule to the loan agreement was “not readily intelligible”: on its face it 
described the loan as being for a period of 28 days yet it contained provisions which clearly envisaged 
that the duration would be more than 28 days. The schedule also contained an alteration not 
acknowledged by the debtor. The lender took no measures to ensure that the debtor understood the 
nature and implications of the transaction, especially with regard to the repayment of principal and 
interest: Silvy v Hadeler [2008] SADC 64 at [30]. 
71 Australian Capital Providers Pty Ltd v Wakelin [2009] QSC 167 at [10]. 
72  Australian Capital Providers Pty Ltd v Wakelin [2009] QSC 167at [73]. 
73 Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 343 at  [175]. The judge’s mathematical 
calculations of the effects of compound interest resulted in an undertaking from the lender to not 
enforce the mortgage for more than the lower rate at simple interest: at [155], which meant the 
debtor became entitled to a refund. 
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that the provision for the higher interest rate could be unjust without being 
unconscionable74 and even though the debtor had consented to the high rates.75    
• Galadriel Lothlorien Pty Ltd v Station 1 Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 91.  
There guarantees of a loan for  two months of $240000 at an interest rate of 
14.5% per month compounded daily (annualised at 174%) reducible to 7.25% per 
month for payment on time (annualised at 87%) were held unjust.76 The judge 
concluded the interest provisions were extortionate.77 The lender’s insistence 
upon payment at the full compounding default rate had prevented the borrower 
from refinancing and repaying the loan.78 The court refused to enforce any of the 
provisions of the guarantee.  
 
Prohibition against unconscionable conduct in the ASIC Act. 
In addition to provisions dealing with unjust transactions in the NCC, the ASIC Act 
prohibits unconscionable conduct79 in financial services, including credit80: s12CB. As 
with s76 NCC, there is a list of factors that a court may have regard to in making a 
decision about unconscionability. However, s76 NCC includes a wider range of indicia 
than s12CB ASIC Act focusing on procedural requirements. Relevantly for this 
discussion, one of the indicia under s76 NCC is whether at the time the contract was 
entered into or changed, the credit provider knew or could have ascertained by 
reasonable inquiry of the debtor at the time, that the debtor could not pay in 
                                               
74 Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 343 at [171]. 
75 Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 343 at [139]. This decision was made under the 
Contracts Review Act (1980) New South Wales, from which s 76 NCC was derived.  
76 This decision was made under the Contracts Review Act (1980) New South Wales, from which s 76 
NCC was derived. 
77 Galadriel Lothlorien Pty Ltd v Station 1 Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 91] at [33]. 
78 Galadriel Lothlorien Pty Ltd v Station 1 Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 91 at [39]. 
79 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), s 12 CB (1)(5) prohibits a person, 
in trade or commerce, in connection with the supply or possible supply of financial services of a kind 
ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or household use, from engaging in conduct that is, in all 
the circumstances, unconscionable. 
80 Broadly, a person provides a financial service if they provide financial product advice or deal in 
financial products: Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 12BAB. A credit 
facility (within the meaning of the regulations) is a financial product: Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 12BAA (7) (k). ‘Credit’ is defined broadly to mean a contract, 
arrangement or understanding under which payment of a debt owed by one person (a debtor) to 
another person (a credit provider) is deferred or one person (a debtor) incurs a deferred debt to 
another person (a credit provider): Regulation 2B(3) Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Regulations 2001 (Cth). This would include short term small amount loans. 
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accordance with its terms without substantial hardship: s76(2)(l) NCC. This greater 
range of indicia, and the fact that the public interest will also be relevant,81 suggests 
that it will be easier to establish that a transaction is unjust, than that a credit 
provider has contravened the prohibition against engaging in unconscionable 
conduct in the ASIC Act. 82  
 
Unfair contract terms provisions in the ASIC Act 
More recently, regulation of unfair terms in consumer contracts has been 
implemented in the ASIC Act for financial products and services, including credit. 
 
The unfair contract terms provisions apply to standard form83 consumer contracts84 
and operate to make void some unfair terms. A short-term small-amount loan would 
meet the description of a “consumer contract” and would be likely also to be a 
“standard form” contract. 
 
The Subdivision does not apply to terms that set the “upfront price” payable under 
the contract: s 12BI. “Upfront price” is defined in a way that gives an incentive to 
lenders to make full disclosure of high interest rates and fees and charges, as they 
will satisfy the definition only as long as they are disclosed. On the other hand, 
contingent fees payable in the event of a default may be challenged, as these are not 
included in the definition of upfront price: s12BI (2). 
 
A term is unfair if it would cause a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and 
obligations, is not reasonably necessary in order to protect the legitimate interests of 
the party who would be advantaged by the term and would cause detriment 
                                               
81 National Credit Code s76(2). 
82 Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 343 at [216]. This was said of the Contracts 
Review Act 1980 (NSW), and so applies to National Credit Code s 76, in a claim under the state fair 
trading legislation, which was a parallel provision to the former Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 51AB, 
thus to Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 12CB.  
83 A standard form contract is one prepared by one party to the contract which is not subject to 
negotiation between the parties, but offered on a “take it or leave it” basis: Corones, S, The Australian 
Consumer Law (Lawbook Co, 2011), [6.60]-[6.75], and [6.50] – [6.175]. 
84 A consumer contract is a contract where at least one of the parties is an individual whose 
acquisition of what is supplied is wholly or predominantly an acquisition for personal, domestic or 
household use or consumption: s 12BF (3). 
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(whether financial or otherwise) to a party if it were to be applied or relied on: 
s 12BG (1). In determining whether a term is unfair a court may consider any 
relevant matter but must consider the extent to which the term is transparent and 
the contract as a whole: s12BG (2), (3). This requirement acknowledges that the 
assessment must be about fairness in the context of the agreement as a whole. 85  An 
unfair term is void: s 12BF (1), but the contract continues to bind the parties if it is 
capable of operating without the unfair term: s 12BF (2).   
 
However, default fees and charges can also be challenged on the grounds of 
unfairness under s76 NCC.  A court deciding an application under s76 NCC may 
consider the extent to which a contract was a standard form contract,86 the form of 
the contract and the intelligibility of the language87  which compare with the 
requirement of Subdivision BA to take into account “transparency.”88  Also, a wider 
range of indicia of injustice is listed for a determination that a transaction is unjust 
than that a term is unfair under Subdivision BA, although a court there “may take 
into account such matters as it thinks relevant.”  However, in s12BF ASIC Act, there is 
the potential for a finding that a particular term dealing with default fees is unfair to 
have an application wider than that of the individual transaction before the court.89  
 
E. Restricting entry and monitoring participants in the consumer credit market 
- The Licensing Regime  
 
The new licensing regime in Chapter 2 NCCP Act provides that from 1 July 2011 a 
person must not engage in a “credit activity” without an Australian Credit Licence.90 
A person engages in a credit activity if they are a credit provider or provide a credit 
service, which includes providing credit assistance or acting as an intermediary: ss 6, 
7.  
                                               
85 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, A Guide to the Unfair Contract Terms Law 
(Canberra, 2010), p 13. 
86 National Credit Code s 76(2) (c) (d). 
87 National Credit Code s 76 (2) (g). 
88 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s12BG(3). 
89Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth)  S12GND(1). 
90 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) Chapter 2, Part 2-1, Division 2. 
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ASIC is responsible for administering the licensing regime. ASIC must grant the 
person a licence unless ASIC has “reason to believe” the person is likely to 
contravene the conduct obligations that apply to licensees or is not a fit and proper 
person to engage in credit activities: s 37 (1) (b), (c). In making this decision, ASIC 
must have regard to any other matter ASIC considers relevant: s 37 (2) (i). This 
includes the past business practices of the applicant, conduct that shows wilful 
disregarding of the law, allegations of previous misconduct of which ASIC is aware, 
including those received through complaints by consumers, and all other relevant 
information. 91  
Licensees are required to comply with a number of general conduct obligations. 
These include doing all things necessary to ensure that the credit activities 
authorised by the licence are engaged in efficiently, honestly and fairly; comply with 
the credit legislation and take reasonable steps to ensure that its representatives92 
also comply; have an internal dispute resolution procedure that complies with the 
standards and requirements of ASIC; be a member of an ASIC-approved external 
dispute resolution scheme; and have adequate arrangements to compensate 
persons for loss or damage caused by the licensee or its representatives 
contravening the Act: ss47,48. 93 
If a licensee contravenes these obligations, ASIC may suspend, cancel or vary a 
licence94 or ban or disqualify a person from engaging in credit activities.95 
The new licensing obligations, with the ‘fit and proper person’ test, may be able to 
weed out credit providers who might engage in unscrupulous practices in the small 
                                               
91 Explanatory Memorandum, National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 paras 2.80 – 2.86. 
92 A credit provider who is licensed may act through an employee or credit representative, who need 
not themselves be licensed: National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) s 29 (3) and Chapter 
2 Part 2-3 Division1.  
93  National Consumer Credit Protection Regulations 2010 (Cth), reg12 requires the licensee to hold 
adequate professional indemnity insurance cover. 
94 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) Chapter 2, Part 2-2, Division 6. 
95 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) Chapter 2, Part 2-4. 
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loans market.96  Similarly, the licensing requirements allow for ongoing monitoring 
of industry players, again providing an opportunity for the regulator to identify and 
suspend unscrupulous operators. However, we would expect that the powers to 
reject a licence application or to suspend or cancel a licence would be exercised only 
in the more extreme cases.   
 
F. Access to justice and consumer redress through Independent External 
Dispute Resolution Schemes and small claims procedures 
 
Another important reform of Phase One was to require the credit industry to provide 
a forum for consumers to resolve complaints that would be quicker and cheaper 
than the formal legal system.97  This is particularly important in the context of the 
small loans market where borrowers are often likely to lack the means to seek 
remedies through the courts, and where most credit providers were not previously 
under a legal obligation to provide access to an external dispute resolution (EDR) 
service.98  
 
Internal Dispute Resolution (IDR) is the first step in the dispute resolution process. 
Licensees are required to provide IDR processes that meet ASIC standards. 99 If the 
credit provider is unable to resolve a complaint to the consumer’s satisfaction or 
within the time limit, the credit provider must advise the consumer of their right to 
                                               
96 Although consumer groups have raised concerns  about the granting of a licence to Motor Finance 
Wizard, see for example, Consumer Action Law Centre, ASIC grants licence to ‘misleading, deceptive 
and unconscionable’ trader, Media Release, 22 July 2011.  
97 Regulation Impact Statement Dispute resolution requirements for consumer credit and margin 
lending ASIC May 2010 paras 42, 57.  
98 The situation prior to the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) was noted by the 
Productivity Commission in its report on Consumer Policy: Productivity Commission, Review of 
Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, No 45 (2008), p 99. 
99 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) s 47(1)(h); National Consumer Credit Protection 
Regulations 2010 (Cth), reg 10(1), (2); ASIC’s role in and requirements for Internal Dispute Resolution 
schemes are explained in Australian Securities and Investments Commission Regulatory Guide 165 
[RG165] Licensing: Internal and external dispute resolution schemes. 
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complain to an EDR scheme and the name and contact details of the particular EDR 
scheme to which the credit provider belongs.100  
 
Two schemes have been approved by ASIC to provide external dispute resolution 
services for complaints brought by consumers against credit industry members. 
These are the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS)101 and the Credit Ombudsman 
Service Limited (COSL). The main criteria considered in approving schemes are 
accountability, accessibility, independence, fairness, accountability, efficiency and 
effectiveness.102  
 
When making decisions, the Schemes take into account a broad range of criteria - 
the law, applicable industry codes or guidelines, good industry practice and fairness 
in all the circumstances.103 The Schemes are not bound by the rules of evidence.104  
The services offered by the Schemes are free of charge to consumers105 as they are 
funded by industry.  
 
A key protection is that once a consumer lodges a dispute with a Scheme, the credit 
provider may not take any proceedings against the consumer for debt recovery or 
any aspect of the dispute. 106 In addition, consumers are not bound by decisions of a 
Scheme. 107 This is not the case for industry members, as the Scheme Rules provide 
                                               
100 The time limit is 45 days but consideration is being given to reduce this for complaints about 
default notices and complaints involving hardship: Regulation Impact Statement Dispute resolution 
requirements for consumer credit and margin lending ASIC May 2010. 
101 Formed on 1 July 2008 by a merger of the Financial Industry Complaints Service Limited (FICS), the 
Insurance Ombudsman Service (IOS); the Banking and Financial Services Ombudsman Limited (BFSO). 
The Credit Union Dispute Resolution Centre (CUDRC) and the Insurance Brokers Disputes Centre Ltd 
(IBD) subsequently joined. 
102 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Regulatory Guide 139 Approval of external 
complaints resolution schemes; issued by ASIC on 8 July 1999. See also National Consumer Credit 
Protection Regulations 2010 (Cth) reg 10(3),(4) and Regulation Impact Statement Dispute resolution 
requirements for consumer credit and margin lending ASIC May 2010 paras 20, 21. 
103 FOS Terms of Reference cl 8.2; COSL Rules 7th edition 1 July 2010 Rule 12.1 
104 FOS Terms of Reference cl 8.1; COSL Rules 7th edition 1 July 2010 Rule 39.3. 
105 FOS Terms of Reference cl 1.1; COSL Rules 7th edition 1 July 2010 Rule 11.1. 
106 FOS Terms of Reference 1 January 2010 (as amended 1 July 2010) Rule 13.1; COSL Rules 7th edition 
1 July 2010 Rules 17. 
107 FOS Terms of Reference 1 January 2010 (as amended 1 July 2010) Rule 8.9; COSL Rules 7th edition 1 
July 2010 Rules 1.6, 39.3. 
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that their decisions bind industry members,108 with COSL requiring compliance with 
a decision within a specified time.109  A decision can include an award of 
compensation of up to $280,000 (FOS) or $500,000 (COSL). 110  
 
A member who failed to comply with a Scheme decision could be subject to 
enforcement action by the Scheme, including taking legal proceedings to recover the 
amount awarded and action to expel the member. 111  Expulsion from membership 
would prevent a credit provider from complying with their continuing statutory 
obligation to be a member of an approved EDR scheme.112 If this occurred, ASIC 
might also take further action against such a credit provider.113 
 
In addition, the Scheme could notify ASIC of the failure to comply.114 ASIC has 
advised that there are a number of administrative responses available following a 
referral of non-compliance by a licensee with a decision of a scheme.115 These 
include, as a last resort, suspending or revoking a licence for the failure of the 
licensee to conduct business efficiently, honestly and fairly.116 A credit provider 
whose licence was suspended or cancelled would not be able to carry on business,117 
as to do so would involve the commission of an offence. 118 
 
In addition to IDR and EDR, a small claims court procedure119 to facilitate the 
determination of some claims has been provided for in the NCCP Act.120 A consumer 
may apply to have a claim for compensation for loss suffered through entering an 
                                               
108  FOS Terms of Reference cl 8.7; COSL Rules 25.4, 26.8. 
109 COSL Rules 26.8 - within the time specified in the Award or as soon as practicable.  
110 FOS Terms of Reference cl 9.7, COSL Rules 7th edition 1 July 2010 Rules 9.1, 25.1. 
111 FICS v Deakin Financial Services Pty Ltd (2006) 60 ACSR 372. 
112 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) s 47(1)(i) .   
113 ASIC could suspend or cancel the licence: National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) s55 
(1) (a).  
114 FOS Terms of Reference13.7, FOS constitution cl 3.10; COSL Rules 28.1.  
115 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Regulatory Guide 139 Approval of external 
complaints resolution schemes at [139.128]. 
116  National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) s 47(1)(a). 
117 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth), Chapter 2, Part 2-1, Division 2.  
118 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) s 29, attracting a penalty not exceeding 200 
penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years or both and a civil penalty. 
119 In the magistrates court, local court or Federal Magistrates Court. 
120 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) Chapter 4, Part 4-3, Division 2. 
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unsuitable contract in breach of the credit provider’s responsible lending obligations, 
an application to reopen an unjust credit transaction or change and a claim that an 
establishment fee is unconscionable, dealt with under this procedure: s199(1)NCCP 
Act. This is subject to a monetary limit of no more than $40,000 for the claim for 
compensation and for the amount of credit respectively: s199(2) NCCP Act.  
 
The advantage of this procedure for borrowers of small amount credit is that the 
court is not bound by rules of evidence: s199(5), legal representation is allowed only 
by leave of the court: s199(6) and a costs order may be made against a party only if 
the court is satisfied the party brought the proceedings vexatiously or without 
reasonable cause or the party’s unreasonable act or omission caused the other party 
to incur the costs: s200. 
 
 
IV  Phase Two proposals: tThe Consumer Credit and Corporations Amendment 
(Enhancements) Bill 2011 (Cth) 
 
While there is the potential for many of the problems reported with small loans to 
be resolved through the Phase One changes, or indeed the older remedies for unjust 
transactions and prohibition of  unconscionable conduct, it is apparent that the 
Commonwealth Government has formed a view that additional protections are 
needed to address the remaining issues associated with small loans. It proposes to 
provide these protections though the Consumer Credit and Corporations 
Amendment (Enhancements) Bill 2011.  
 
The Bill impacts differentially on small loan contracts compared to other credit 
contracts in two ways: 
1. Schedule 3 would amend the NCCP Act toIt imposes additional responsible 
lending conduct obligations on licensees in relation to small amount credit 
contracts; and 
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2. Schedule 4 would amend the NCCC to It imposes different limits on the cost 
of credit for small amount contracts and uses  different measures to 
determine the limits.  
 
Under the Enhancements Bill, a credit contract is defined to be a “small amount 
credit contract” if the contract is not a continuing credit contract, the credit provider 
is not an ADI, the debtor’s obligations are not secured by a mortgage, the credit limit 
is $2000 (or other prescribed amount) or less, the term is 2 years (or other 
prescribed term) or less and the contract meets any other requirements prescribed 
by the regulations. 121 
 
The new responsible lending obligations proposed for credit providers and credit 
assistance providers for small amount credit contracts include having their websites 
advise of financial counselling and legal services and of alternatives to high cost 
loans: ss124A, 133CA.122 If they know, or are reckless as to whether, the consumer is 
a debtor under another small amount credit contract, they must not enter into 
another such credit contract: ss124B, 133B. They must not increase the credit limit 
of such a contract: ss124C, 133CD or refinance another such contract: s133CC. 
Contravention of each of these attracts a civil and criminal penalty and is an unlawful 
credit activity under s180 NCCP Act which allows the court to make variety of orders 
to prevent the defendant from profiting. The aim of these provisions is to address 
the potential for debt spirals.  
 
In relation to price regulation of small loans, the Bill provides that an establishment 
fee, a monthly fee and a default charge are the only fees and charges permitted in 
small amount credit contracts: s31A. The establishment fee must reflect the credit 
provider’s reasonable costs of determining the application and the initial 
administrative costs of providing the credit and must not exceed 10% of the adjusted 
credit amount under the contract.  The ‘adjusted credit amount’ is the first amount 
                                               
121 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth), s 5; National Credit Code s 204. 
122 The requirements are to be prescribed by regulation: National Consumer Credit Protection Act 
2009 (Cth) ss 124A, 133CA.  
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of credit that is, or is to be, provided under the contract excluding the permitted 
establishment fee and permitted monthly fee: s204NCC.   
 
The monthly fee must not exceed 2% of the adjusted credit amount under the 
contract: s 31A. If there is default in payment, the maximum amount that may be 
recovered by the credit provider must not exceed twice the adjusted credit amount 
and enforcement expenses. If an amount is in fact recovered in excess of this 
limitation, the debtor may recover it: s39B. 
 
No interest or any other fee or charge may be imposed: s23A. Consistently with the 
prohibition of interest, the credit provider need not comply with the requirements of 
s 17 to disclose an APR, the method of calculation of interest or the total amount of 
interest: s 17(4) – (6). 
 
The Enhancements Bill also proposes to limit the application of the credit so that, 
apart from the permitted fees or charges or government charges, no part of the 
amount of credit provided under a small amount credit contract may be applied to 
pay an amount to the credit provider or a prescribed person: s39A.  
 
The application of these provisions can be illustrated as follows. A loan of $300 for 
three months could have an establishment fee of no more than $30 and three 
monthly charges of no more than $6 - a total of $48. If the debtor defaults, the credit 
provider cannot raise the limit, refinance the loan or enter into a new contract; the 
only remedy allowed is recovery of the principal of $300, the charges of $48 and a 
default charge of $252, to bring the total to twice the principal. As enforcement 
expenses may also be recovered, default can be quite expensive for a debtor.  
In contrast, a review of loans offered in South East Queensland in 2008 showed five 
loans of $300 repayable over 12 or 13 weeks. For these loans, the total amount 
repayable ranged from $437.98 to $572.28 (assuming no defaults), and the 
annualised APRs ranged from 330% - 580%.123 
                                               
123 Howell, Wilson and Davidson, n 14,  p 44. 
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For credit contracts other than small amount credit contracts, bridging finance 
contracts or contracts where the credit provider is an ADI, the Bill imposes a cap on 
the cost of credit of 48%, calculated in accordance with athe statutory formula: 
s32A, s32B.   
 
Although this Bill appears to accept that using annual interest rates is not 
appropriate for short term products,124 it can be difficult for consumers to compare 
the cost of credit with products that do disclose an APR.125  In this example, if the 
debtor repays in accordance with the contract, the credit provider receives a return 
of 16% for three months (APR 64%). A term of two months would produce a return 
of 14% for two months (APR 84%) whereas a term of one month would yield a return 
of 12% (APR 144%).  
 
It is interesting to note that a term of five months produces a return of 20%, which 
equals the 48% APR allowed for credit contracts other than short term ones, while if 
the term were six months, the return would be 22% (APR 44%), and so less than the 
48% allowed for all other credit contracts. Thus, at least for the shorter term 
contracts, it appears that the Enhancement Bill provisions would allow a greater 
return than was possible under the State/Territory interest rate caps of 48% APR. In 
addition, for this example, the lender is no better off than under the provisions 
applying to other loans (not small amount credit contracts) if the loan term is five 
months, and is in fact worse off if the term is six months or more. The fact that the 
monthly amount permitted under the Enhancements Bill is relatively small compared 
to the establishment fee permitted might also suggest an incentive for credit 
providers to prefer shorter, rather than longer terms, for any given loan size. If this is 
the case, it might increase the likelihood of default for borrowers, which would not 
be in their interests.  
 
                                               
124 Marston and Shevellar, n 13, p 37. 
125 Regulatory Impact Statement for SL 2007 No 302 (Consumer Credit (Bill Facilities) Amendment 
Regulation (No 1) 2007 (Qld) made under the Consumer Credit (Queensland) Act 1994 (Qld) p 17 
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V Comparing the different forms of regulation designed to address the problems 
with small loans 
 
As we discuss above, there have been a number of different regulatory approaches 
used in Australia to address problems that have been associated with the small loans 
that are available in the commercial sector.  
 
For the problems still to be solved – that of the high cost, and potential for debt 
spirals and consequent depleting of an individual’s financial position – the current 
legislation focuses on flexible, individualised solutions (for example, re-opening 
unjust transactions, prohibiting unconscionable conduct or unsuitable lending).126 
The Enhancements Bill, however, takes a different approach, with a more 
decontextualised, “bright line” solution of imposing a maximum price for credit.  
 
Existing provisions dealing with unjust transactions, unconscionable conduct, and 
unsuitable lending allow flexibility and a nuanced approach to individual matters, as 
each matter must be considered in light of its own circumstances and surrounding 
facts. While there is a series of particular matters that a Court may have regard to, 
there is no prioritising of those matters, and the Court can make its decision based 
on the circumstances and characteristics of the specific parties and transaction 
before it.127  
 
To be successful, this type of legislation relies on consumers being able to recognise 
that they have a legal problem or a legal right, and having the resources (emotional, 
financial and practical) to pursue that right. However, consumers on low incomes 
often have little awareness of legal rights, and are very reluctant to pursue legal 
rights when they do identify a problem.128 This reluctance may be even more 
                                               
126 These type of provisions are described by Cartwright as ‘open-texture rules’; Cartwright, P, Banks, 
consumers and regulation (Hart Publishing, Portland, 2004),  p 152. 
127 For example, the various factors set out in National Credit Code s76. 
128 Schetzer, L, Drowning in debt: The experiences of people who seek assistance from 
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pronounced where the consumer feels reliant upon a particular service provider, as 
may be the case for consumers using small loans on a regular basis.129 The fee-free 
external dispute resolution schemes discussed above are a critical mechanism for 
ensuring access to justice, but cost is not the only barrier for low income consumers 
pursuing rights, and in any case, there have been concerns expressed that 
disadvantaged groups may have low awareness of, and thus under-utilise, industry 
dispute schemes.130  
 
Even if an individual matter is pursued, the extent to which individual decisions have 
a wider impact on practices is not known. Precisely because of their individualised 
approach, decisions that a particular transaction was unjust, for example, may not 
necessarily influence other industry members to change their practices. We are not 
aware, for example, whether short term lenders in Queensland reduced their 
interest rates to 48% following the Cash Solutions decision discussed above, and 
there are some grounds for assuming there was only a limited flow-on effect.131 
 
The difficulties faced by low income consumers when pursuing rights may be 
partially overcome where the consumer is able to access legal advice, support 
                                                                                                                                      
financial counsellors, Department of Justice, Victoria, 2007, p 51;  Productivity Commission, n 98, p 
220; Coumarelos, C, Wei, Z and  Zhou, A, Justice made to measure: NSW Legal Needs Survey in 
disadvantaged areas, (Law and Justice Foundation of NSW, Sydney,2006),  p 99. 
129 Over half of the borrowers in the RMIT/UQ study reported having taken out more than 10 small 
loans: Banks, n 8, p 11. See also the discussion on the barriers to low income consumers using these 
provisions in Wilson T, Howell N and Sheehan G Protecting 
the most vulnerable in consumer credit transactions, 32(2)_Journal of Consumer Policy 117 at 129-
130. 
130 Productivity Commission n 98, p 220. See also comments in the independent reviews of the 
predecessor schemes to FOS: Khoury P, Russell D, and Guthrie F, Independent Review Banking and 
Financial Services Ombudsman (2004), p 12, 
http://fos.org.au/centric/home_page/about_us/independent_reviews.jsp viewed 9 November 201; 
Community Solutions, Review of the Financial Industry Complaints Service 2002 – Final Report (2002), 
p 23, http://fos.org.au/centric/home_page/about_us/independent_reviews.jsp viewed 9 November 
2011.  
131 The fact that industry has continue to argue that that an all-inclusive interest rate of 48% (as was 
ordered in the Cash Solutions case described above) is uneconomic suggests perhaps that there has 
been little or no flow on effect from that case. Also, see comments from Legal Aid Queensland about 
the negligible wider impact of a 2003 decision that interest rates of more than 100% were 
unconscionable:  Commonwealth of Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Consumer Credit and Corporations Legislation 
Amendment (Enhancements) Bill 2011, 24 August 2011, p 43-44. 
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and/or representation.132 But such services are also not always easy for consumers 
to access, with high levels of unmet demand for financial counselling services,133 and 
under-resourcing of specialist (free) consumer credit legal services (for example, 
through community legal centre programs or government legal aid offices).134  
 
A second type of legislation simply prohibits the offering of credit products where 
the cost of the product exceeds the maximum cost set by the legislation. This is the 
interest rate cap approach, used in some jurisdictions in Australia, 135 and proposed 
nationally (although in a different form) in the Enhancements Bill. This is a more 
decontextualised approach. It is not dependent on the nature or characteristics of 
the individual borrower or individual transaction. Instead decisions are made by 
comparing the cost of a loan to a pre-determined maximum. 
 
Deciding upon an appropriate maximum cost is a challenge. To do so scientifically (if 
this is indeed possible) involves quantifying the reasonable cost of providing such 
loans, and/or the cost at which such loans can cause harm. Both exercises can be 
difficult. Assessing the point at which a product may cause harm is further 
complicated by the fact that the product may be used by different consumer 
demographics, in different financial and social circumstances,136 and thus the harm 
may arise at different points for different user groups. 
 
                                               
132 Indeed, in the case of Cash Solutions v Turner and Maguire referred to earlier, the consumer had 
received advice from, and was being represented by, Legal Aid Queensland 
133 Productivity Commission, n 98,  p 223; SACOSS, At the crossroads: financial counselling in South 
Australia, SACOSS Information Paper (May 2011), p 18, 
http://www.sacoss.org.au/online_docs/110505%20At%20the%20Crossroads%20Financial%20Counsel
ling%20in%20SA.pdf viewed 9 November 2011; Uniting Care Queensland, Financial Counselling 
Discussion Paper (May 2011), p 6, available from 
http://www.ucareqld.com.au/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=43&Itemid=31 viewed 
15 November 2011. 
134 Productivity Commission, n 98, p 221-222. 
135 Interest rate caps were used in New South Wales until 1 July 2011, in Victoria and the Australian 
Capital Territory until 1 April 2010 and are still used in Queensland.   
136 For example, while a large number of small loan customers are on low incomes, one provider (Cash 
Doctors) has explained that its customer group s predominantly employed full-time, with average 
annual salaries of $40,000: Commonwealth of Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Consumer Credit and Corporations 
Legislation Amendment (Enhancements) Bill 2011, 24 August 2011,  p 16. 
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In addition, if a cap is set below the reasonable costs of providing loans, there is 
likely to be a reduction in supply and/or an increase in avoidance activities. 137 
 
However, price regulation can be relatively easy to enforce (assuming a suitably 
empowered, resourced and willing regulator), does not rely solely or even primarily 
on individuals making complaints and pursuing action, and can have a more 
immediate and direct flow-on effect to other lenders, resulting in widespread change 
in behaviour. These advantages are particularly important when the likely 
beneficiaries (or a large proportion of them) are vulnerable or disadvantaged in the 
market, and constrained in their choices, and where there is a lack of price 
competition in the market. These are all the case in the small loans market.   
 
By prohibiting loans above a certain amount, this approach can also reduce what has 
been called the ‘poverty premium’ – where the poorest in our community pay more 
for the basics they need to survive than does the rest of the community.138  
 
No form of legislation is perfect. Each has its own benefits and costs. The question 
here for governments to consider is whether the flexibility and nuance of the 
individualised rights is sufficient in the small loans market, or whether the added 
protection of a bright line rule is needed. In part, this may also depend on the extent 
to which decision makers have confidence in market mechanisms to address 
consumer needs, and in the ability of consumers to exercise their rights under 
consumer legislation. 
 
VI Meeting the consumer needs and monitoring the impact 
 
                                               
137 As has reportedly been the case with the NSW interest rate cap, see for example, Commonwealth 
of Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial 
Services, Consumer Credit and Corporations Legislation Amendment (Enhancements) Bill 2011, 24 
August 2011, p 18. 
138 The concept of the poverty premium is referred to in Burton M, Making ends meet: The costs and 
implications of money management for low-income consumers, (Consumer Focus, September 2011), p 
4, http://www.consumerfocus.org.uk/files/2011/09/making_ends_meet.pdf viewed 4 November 
2011. 
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As we have noted above, there is currently a large market for small  loans. Industry 
members have suggested that this reflects a strong consumer demand for the 
product, and that a decrease in supply that will follow if the Enhancements Bill is 
implemented will therefore have an adverse effect on consumer welfare. However, 
given the most common uses of small loans are to cover basic living expenses, 
another view might that there is a consumer demand for a solution to the problem 
of having insufficient income to cover daily expenses. Commercial small  loans are 
not the only solution, and indeed arguably do not provide a long-term solution for 
many recipients.139 However, other solutions are not yet widely available. 
 
Government, industry, and consumer representatives all seem to agree that there 
will be a reduction in the supply of small loans if the Enhancements Bill is passed; 
they disagree on the extent and/or problematic nature of a reduction.140 If the 
legislation is passed, and supply is reduced as a result, the Government will 
therefore need to devote resources to other welfare and market solutions to the 
problem that is currently been addressed by the easy availability of small loans in the 
commercial sector. Borrowers of small loans themselves have suggested other 
solutions such as: 
 
• An increase in Centrelink payments and pensions; 
• Centrelink payments to be made weekly rather than fortnightly; 
• Centrelink advances to be made more flexible, in smaller amounts, and with 
shorter repayment schedules; 
• An increase in the minimum wage; 
                                               
139 This is certainly the view of many consumer advocates as expressed in Howell, Wilson and 
Davidson, n 14, p 61. 
140 See for example, Regulation Impact Statement, The Regulation of Short Term, Small Amount 
Finance (June 2011)  p 60 (suggesting that lenders providing about 25% of the market would cease 
operating (under a more generous model than that proposed in the Enhancements Bill), 
http://ris.finance.gov.au/files/2011/09/RIS-Short-term-small-amount-finance.pdf viewed 9 November 
2011; Commonwealth of Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services, Consumer Credit and Corporations Legislation Amendment 
(Enhancements) Bill 2011, 24 August 2011, p 19, where one industry member suggested that ‘The 10 
and two percent is absolutely not viable by any means’; and p 42 where one consumer advocates 
explains ‘to us, the purpose of the reform properly seems to be to reduce the harm that these 
products cause to consumers. That necessarily means a reduction in the very short-term low-amount 
products that are currently available in the market.’  
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• Increased support for training and job seeking.141 
 
In addition, government promoted solutions could include increasing the capacity of 
Low Interest and No-Interest Loan Schemes to provide loans for more consumers, 
and for a wider range of reasons; increasing the accessibility and promotion of 
hardship schemes, so that consumers can have more time to pay bills; and providing 
support for Community Development Finance Initiatives.142 The Assistant Treasurer 
has foreshadowed the release of a discussion paper ‘with more detailed proposals to 
improve access to alternatives to payday loans’.143 However, we believe that this will 
need to do more than simply provide further resources to existing Low Interest and 
No-interest Loan Schemes. 
 
Further, if the legislation is passed, the government will need to monitor the impact 
of the changes upon all stakeholders, so that future decisions on price regulation can 
be made with a strong information base. The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, in its Consumer Policy Toolkit, suggests that the final 
step in any consumer policy review process should be ‘developing a policy review 
process to evaluate the effectiveness of the policy’.144 The extent to which there has 
been a detailed evaluation of the effectiveness of the previous interest rate caps 
regulation in the States and Territories is not known, but there is now an opportunity 
to put in place a process for a proper evaluation of the national legislation. More 
generally, the Productivity Commission has been critical of the extent of consumer 
research in Australia, and the impact of this on the policy process, 145 and this issue 
                                               
141 Banks, n 8,  p 22. 
142 See discussion of some of the potential regulatory barriers to community development finance 
initiatives in ANZ, Community Development Finance in Australia, ANZ’s Response to Consultation 
(November 2004), pp 27-28, 
http://www.anz.com/resources/0/0/001ec0804f22081390e4b36edaf3a73e/Community-
Development-Response.pdf?CACHEID=5766f1804f1d3e84a558b558b54e5b8d  viewed 25 November 
2011.  
143 The Hon Bill Shorten MP, Reforms to Payday lending, Media Release 25 August 2011,  
http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2011/123.htm&pageID=003&
min=brs&Year=&DocType=0 viewed 9 November 2011. 
144 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Consumer Policy Toolkit, (OECD 
Committee on Consumer Policy, 2010), p 14 
145 Productivity Commission, n98,  pp 283-4. 
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of price regulation in consumer credit could usefully benefit from more extensive 
studies. 
 
VII Conclusion 
 
This article has examined the proposals in the Consumer Credit and Corporations 
Amendments (Enhancements) Bill 2011 as they impact upon the market for small 
loans. A major impact of the legislation, if passed, will be to introduce a two-tiered 
regime for price regulation of consumer credit. For small loans, there will be a 10% 
cap on establishment fees and a 2% cap on monthly fees, and for all other loans, 
there will be a 48% interest rate cap.   
 
These proposals come towards the end of an extensive period of reform in consumer 
credit, with many changes having already been made to address concerns about the 
small loans in the commercial sector and the practices of some small loan providers. 
These include amendments to ensure small loans could not be taken outside the 
scope of the credit legislation (for example, by using the pawnbrokers’ exception) 
and to prohibit specific undesirable practices that had been associated with this 
lending (such as taking security over basic household items). In addition, longer-
standing provision of remedies for unjust transactions, unconscionable fees and 
unconscionable conduct provide an opportunity to challenge small loans on the basis 
of their high costs.  
 
More recently, the Phase One changes to consumer credit regulation have 
introduced obligations upon all credit providers that should have a particular effect 
in the small loans market. These include reducing the entry and/or presence of 
unscrupulous providers through licensing requirements, ensuring that loans 
provided are affordable and sustainable through the responsible lending obligations, 
and increasing opportunities for consumers to raise concerns about contraventions 
of the legislation, through compulsory IDR and EDR, and the establishment of a small 
claims court procedure.   
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Despite this framework, concerns about the high cost of small loans and the 
potential for debt spirals appear to remain, and the Enhancements Bill responds to 
those concerns.  
 
The approach taken in the Enhancements Bill to introduce price regulation can be 
seen as a decontextualised, bright line regulatory approach. This contrasts with the 
more flexible and individualised approaches seen in the provision of remedies for 
unjust transactions and unconscionable conduct. Price regulation focuses on the 
substantive, rather than the procedural, and assumes that the community should 
not support the provision of loans above a particular cost point. While this approach 
seems arbitrary, we have argued above that there are some advantages of using this 
form of regulatory approach, particularly in a context where many of the borrowers 
have low incomes, are borrowing to meet daily living expenses, and are constrained 
in their choices with respect to managing their finances.  
 
If this approach is chosen, a key challenge is to set the maximum cost. In the 
Enhancements Bill, the government is proposing a two-tiered approach, recognising 
a different market for small loans compared to other loans. The extent to which the 
price set for the small loan market significantly restricts the supply of small loans 
remains to be seen. However, the government’s policy objective is focused on 
reducing harm to consumers and facilitating financial inclusion, which has recently 
been defined as ‘access to appropriate and affordable financial products and 
services’.146  
 
The size of the small loans market suggests that there is a high demand for a solution 
to the problem of insufficient income. If the legislation is passed, the government 
will need to devote serious resources to both monitoring its impact and developing, 
or supporting the development of, alternative, and more financially sustainable, 
solutions to the insufficient income problem. Without this, while the number of high 
                                               
146 Connolly C, Georgouras M, Hems L and Wolfson L, Measuring Financial Exclusion in Australia, 
Centre for Social Impact (CSI) – University of New South Wales ( 2011)  for National Australia Bank, p 
6. 
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cost small loans, and the risk of debt spirals, is likely to be reduced, the wider goals 
of financial inclusion may not be fully realised. 
 
Postcript 
Since we wrote this article, two Parliamentary Reports of Inquiry into the Consumer 
Credit and Corporations Legislation Amendment (Enhancements) Bill 2011 have 
become available. The Report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations 
and Financial Services (PJC) and the Report of the Senate Economics Legislation 
Committee were both released in December 2011.  
 
Both Committees concluded that the reforms proposed by this Bill would not strike 
the right balance between consumer protection and the continuation of a viable short-
term loan industry,147 although they agreed that consumers of short-term loans need 
protection from the very high costs of this finance.148 The Committees noted the lack 
of evidence from Treasury regarding the need for measures in addition to the 
responsible lending obligations and how they would interact with those obligations,149 
the lack of explanation of why these measures were chosen150 and the absence of 
economic modelling for the 10% and 2% cap.151 The PJC doubted whether the 
proposed 48% cap would be viable, particularly for smaller providers,152 considered 
the proposed 10% and 2% caps to be unworkable153 and concluded that the 
restrictions on multiple concurrent contracts, refinancing and increasing credit limits 
may contradict, rather than complement, the responsible lending obligations.154 The 
Committees recommended the Government review the proposed reforms155 and 
                                               
147 Report of Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 
of Inquiry on Consumer Credit and Corporations Legislation Amendment 
(Enhancements) Bill 2011 December 2011 paras 5.224, 5.232, 5.233; Report of the 
Senate Economics Legislation Committee on Consumer Credit and Corporations 
Legislation Amendment (Enhancements) Bill 2011 December 2011 para 2.46.  
 
148 PJC Report paras 5.222, 5.224, 5.234; Senate Report paras 2.44, 2.46 
149 PJC Report para 5.221; Senate Committee Report para 2.42. 
150 PJC Report para 5.221; Senate Committee Report para 2.42. 
151 PJC Report para 5.180.; Senate Committee Report para 2.43. 
152 PJC Report para 5.235. 
153 PJC Report para 5.243. 
154 PJC Report para 5.243.  
155 PJC Report para 5.245; Senate Committee Report paras 2.47,2.48.  
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publish modelling on the effect of the 10%, 2% and 48% caps on the commercial 
viability of the payday loan industry. 156 
 
The views expressed in the Reports make it less likely that the Bill will be enacted in 
its current form and so we wait with interest to see the direction of further reform.  
 
 
                                               
156 Senate Committee Report  para 2.48. Formatted: English (United States)
